Dwarkesh Patel Nov 13, 2026 Article voiceover 0:00 -44:26 Audio playback is not supported on your browser. Please upgrade. Many thanks to Max Farrens , Gabe Fried , and Thomas Larsen for pairing with me through significant parts of writing and researching this essay.
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If you asked me earlier this year how far away we are from superintelligence, I’d probably have said at least the better part of a decade. But over the last three months, I’ve updated my views a ton. I’ve been debating people about this question, both on and off the podcast. And I’ve been watching the progress of AI on verifiable domains and thinking about what that implies for AI research itself.
I’ve now come to the view that we’re only a couple of years away, and possibly only a couple of months away, from AIs that are as good as the best humans at AI research. I’ve also come to believe that automating AI research will compress so much progress into a single year that, soon thereafter (so by 2030, but plausibly as early as next year), we’ll have AIs that are at least as good as the best human experts in every field. I know this is a wild claim, and it’s one that I myself didn’t believe even a couple of months ago. Let me walk you through how my thinking has changed.
Before we get into more speculative arguments, I want to point out that we have a lot of evidence that AI is already dramatically speeding up further AI progress at the frontier.
For example, METR, which is an independent evaluation organization, concluded after three months embedded inside Anthropic that Anthropic’s overall rate of progress on well-scoped tasks is 2x what it was a year ago, and that a “majority of this acceleration today is likely attributable to Anthropic’s extensive use of AI to do R&D.”
OpenAI published a blog post about this in September, where they showed that the heaviest 10% of AI users among OpenAI’s researchers went from using around $1,000 a day of internal coding agents at the beginning of the summer to over $7,000 a day by the end of August.
In September, Anthropic put out a similar post on its own AI uplift. They reported that, as of August, Claude “leads” more than 26% of Anthropic’s AI R&D work—up from under 1% as recently as February. 1
When I think about how big a deal it could be if AIs automate AI research, and how soon that could happen, a really important update for me has been just seeing how quickly AI capabilities in mathematics have exploded. Current AIs are slicing through well-scoped problems in mathematics like a hot knife through butter. It was only two years ago that I asked Dario why LLMs aren’t able to use their vast knowledge across so many different fields in order to connect different ideas and make new discoveries. And lo and behold, here we are: In a wholly verifiable domain like mathematics, AIs are doing this search-and-match discovery to such a great extent that hundreds of important results (which the top mathematicians and computer scientists in the world had spent decades trying to resolve) are being churned out as side quests to hype up future model releases .
It’s crazy how fast we went from, in 2023, “This model can’t reliably add four-digit numbers,” to, in 2024, “This model can barely solve any problems in a high school math competition,” to, in 2025, “Oh, it can win a gold medal at the International Mathematical Olympiad,” to, earlier this year, “Wow, it’s solving open Erdős problems, but maybe just because no human has attempted to solve these particular problems, and a similar solution was already in the literature,” to, about a month ago, “Okay, it fucking solved a Millennium Prize problem in 88 hours.”
There’s a line in the novel East of Eden : “And there is one sure thing about the fall of gods: they do not fall a little; they crash and shatter.”
It’s true that progress has skewed disproportionately towards the verification-laden parts of math, like finding counterexamples (rather than coming up with new theories, say). Toby Ord posted a great essay about this recently. He writes , “While current AI systems are starting to automate mathematical proof, there is currently very little evidence that they can ask powerful questions or find profound new fields of mathematical enquiry.”
But another way to say the same point would be: Current AI systems have solved a Millennium Prize problem, all without the ability to ask powerful questions or find profound new fields of mathematical inquiry.
And this ability to solve well-scoped problems is going to be an even bigger deal for machine learning research than for mathematics, broadly construed. That’s because the goal of mathematics research is not just to prove or disprove long lists of conjectures, but to extend human understanding of mathematical concepts. Coming up with the idea of topology, group theory, or the Cartesian grid matters far more than knowing exactly how many one-unit-apart pairs you can make from n dots . We mainly care about such abstruse questions insofar as they might elicit new mathematical theories.
But in AI research, the priorities are exactly reversed. AI labs mainly care about how any new algorithmic recipe empirically makes training more efficient or elicits smarter models. They don’t care about theory for its own sake, and all the progress we’ve made in deep learning over the last decade and a half has not required much new theory anyway. The equivalent of grinding through random conjectures would be enormously valuable in machine learning in a way that it just isn’t in mathematics.
AI research is actually surprisingly similar to the type of mathematical progress that current AIs are disproportionately good at: unlocking a ton of low-hanging fruit by applying a combination of incredible persistence and a superhuman capacity to connect ideas from lots of adjacent domains.
For example, let’s talk about the transformer architecture. My friend Sholto Douglas , who is an AI researcher, has a perennially half-finished blog post where he explains how you could have invented the transformer two years earlier than people actually did. Maybe this essay will get him to quit stalling and complete it, but in the meantime, I’ll summarize a bit of the discussion I had with him about the contents of that essay.
Before the transformer paper was published in 2017, many researchers had already identified attention as a way to better parallelize training and communicate information across longer sequences. Chris Olah, who was an active researcher then, has said : “At the time, my sense is that the transformer architecture was a natural combination of many ideas (attention, residual networks) which had independently been effective, taken to quite aggressive lengths.” In other words, none of the core pieces were a surprise to researchers working in the field.
So then why didn’t people invent the transformer sooner? One reason was that this new architecture was only obviously better than the state of the art once you connected half a dozen additional tweaks and innovations. And though all of these had been in the literature for years, 2 no one knew how to combine the puzzle pieces. Doing so required research taste, of course, but also tons and tons of small experiments.
But what I’ve just described above—persistently and intelligently matching dozens of different combinations of ideas—is exactly the kind of capability that AIs have shown themselves disproportionately skilled at in their contributions to mathematics.
This is all to say, even the transformer, which is arguably the biggest breakthrough in ML since AlexNet kicked off the deep learning revolution in 2012, is the kind of thing that Claude 7 could invent if Chris Olah asked it to try hard to get this attention thing to work better.
I want to clarify that some parts of AI research are, in fact, less verifiable than math. That’s why OpenAI hasn’t fired all of its researchers, despite having a model that can autonomously solve Millennium Prize problems. But I think AI research is verifiable enough that AIs will soon be as good at it as the best humans. Explaining why requires getting into the nitty-gritty of how AI research actually works, and because those details are interesting but technical, I’ve saved them for the Appendix—if you’re curious, just keep reading after the conclusion. But in the meantime, I’ll give you my estimate of when we get there.
If I had to pick my median year for when automated researchers will be as good as the very best human AI researchers (and assuming the labs don’t intentionally slow down), I’d guess 2028.
Why do I think AIs could get this good within two years? In every domain where we can check answers and give AIs thousands of rounds of practice—for example, competitive programming contests, or well-scoped open math problems—they’ve gone from worse than most humans to better than the best humans within a few years. And as I detail in the Appendix, AI research has those same verifiable properties.
Of course, a big part of what makes a top AI researcher like Ilya Sutskever so good can’t be directly verified—for example, his ability to bet, years in advance, on the right research direction. But as we’ve seen in math, models generalize far beyond what they were directly trained on. OpenAI’s model was obviously not trained by solving other Millennium Prize problems. It was trained on lots of less ambitious, more tractable math problems, and from those it generalized all the way to solving a problem no human had ever cracked. I’d expect the same in AI research, where the combination of thousands of rounds of practice on verifiable research tasks, plus the fact that each new generation of models is broadly smarter than the last, will make models excellent even at the parts of AI research we can’t directly check.
I want to be clear that there’s a pretty decent chance that hitting this milestone takes longer because some important part of AI research remains hard to automate. I’d guess there’s a 25% chance that it doesn’t happen until after 2032. 3 But I also think things could move much faster, and that we could hit this milestone in 2027. Some of the most well-informed researchers I know, people who have had a very good track record of prediction over the last few years, expect AI to beat the best humans at AI research as early as next year. And 2027 is also the straightforward implication of plugging METR’s finding—that Anthropic’s rate of AI progress has doubled in a year—into a takeoff model.
As former guest Ajeya Cotra put it in a blog post about this report :
If we take it at face value that AI is now nearly doubling the rate of AI capabilities progress and assume acceleration from AI is smooth, this naively implies that we would reach extreme superintelligence within a year.
The reason my median is not that soon is that I’m uncertain about how accurate this straightforward modeling is. But we should not be surprised if we get to this milestone next year, and we should be prepared for such a world.
Once AI is as good as the best humans at AI research, algorithmic progress will get radically faster. There are three important reasons why: The automated researchers will be much faster, each of them will be very smart, and there’ll be a lot more of them.
Today’s AIs already do work at about 10 times human speed. 4 And automated researchers would also be working around the clock, nights and weekends included. As a result, each individual automated researcher will be cramming in roughly 50x more work every calendar week than a human researcher can do.
Of course, that doesn’t mean AI progress will immediately accelerate 50x. Those automated researchers would still be bottlenecked by compute for experiments, which aren’t running any faster. So there would be diminishing returns. But even with extremely steep diminishing returns, this alone would make algorithmic progress proceed many times faster than it currently does. 5
And this is before we account for the fact that, in this scenario, every automated researcher will be at least as good at AI R&D as the very best humans.
My sense is that around 80% of the algorithmic progress at a given frontier lab is driven by its top 50 researchers. It’s not for nothing that Zuckerberg was willing to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to acquire the best talent in the industry. And so you get another big speedup in algorithmic progress from the fact that every single engineer and researcher in this automated company will be at the level of the very best humans in today’s frontier AI labs.
Throwing more workers at a problem isn’t always helpful. For example, a swarm of agents probably couldn’t write a great novel much faster than a single agent could. But other tasks lend themselves to parallelization: For example, look at the animation below, showing a bunch of different Claudes working together to formalize Fermat’s Last Theorem . This feat had thousands of modular subtasks, each of which could be completed independently and where each agent could locally check whether its work had succeeded.
AI research is closer to formalizing a theorem than to writing a novel, because there is a lot of independent modular work to do, and there are verifiable proxies for progress. That means a swarm of agents can try a thousand different approaches and see which performs best, and they can do this independently for each different part of the pipeline. AI companies are already made up of dozens of teams working independently on different parts of model development: one team improves how the pretraining data is filtered, another helps design a particular kind of synthetic RL environment, another writes a better attention kernel, and so on. In domains like this, where different streams of work can be done and checked independently, dumping in lots of persistent hill-climbing agents tends to speed up progress a lot.
Again, there will be steeply diminishing returns just from adding more parallel researchers. Anyone who has worked on a team before knows that having 100,000 collaborators doesn’t mean you go 100,000 times faster—probably not even 100 times faster. But it’s implausible that you wouldn’t be going at least a couple of times faster from having orders of magnitude more automated labor.
So the combination of faster, smarter, and more numerous automated researchers will speed up AI progress a lot. But will this pace continue, will it get even faster, or will it slow down? That question is even more important than what the initial pace actually is.
Two competing trends are relevant here. And the subsequent pace of progress will come down to which ends up being more powerful. On the one hand, because of RSI, automated researchers will continue getting faster, smarter, and more plentiful. On the other hand, AI research will be getting harder and harder, as all the easy ideas get eaten away by the swarm.
By the way, “ideas getting harder to find” is a thing that already happens. AI companies have to quadruple their R&D compute and double their workforce every single year just to maintain the same rate of progress.




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